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Introduction
When Saddam Hussein assumes his place in the defendant's dock in
Iraq for his trial later this year or early in 2006, for this second political
trial of the century he will be following in the pathway of Slobodan
Milogevit on trial for crimes against humanity at the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague. For both
leaders on trial, their personalities and political behavior will play key roles
in determining their conduct in the courtroom and influence the outcome
of the trials.
f Portions of this article are reprinted from JERROLD M. POST, LEADERS AND THEIR
FOLLOWERS IN A DANGEROUS WORLD: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR (2004).
Copyright © 2004 by Cornell University. Used by permission of the publisher, Cornell
University Press.
-t Jerrold Post is Professor of Psychiatry, Political Psychology and International
Affairs and Director of the Political Psychology Program at The George Washington
University. During his twenty-one year CIA career, he founded and directed the Center
for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior. Among his extensive publications
are THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION OF POLITICAL LEADERS, WITH PROFILES OF SADDAM
HUSSEIN AND BILL CLINTON (2003) and LEADERS AND THEIR FOLLOWERS IN A DANGEROUS
WORLD: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR (2004). Dr. Post's political psychology
profiles of Hussein, Milo~evit, bin Laden and others have featured prominently in
national and international media. He has testified before Congress on several topics
including terrorist psychology.
ttt Lara Panis is a Research Assistant, with a Master's degree in Security Policy
Studies from the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington
University.
38 CORNELL INr'L L.J. 823 (2005)
Cornell International Law Journal
I. Slobodan Milogevit: From Peace Maker of Dayton to Butcher of
Belgrade to Defendant in International Criminal Tribunal in
The Hague
The NATO alliance now faces the delicate and awkward task of creat-
ing a lasting peace in Kosovo on the basis of an agreement negotiated with
an indicted international war criminal. Previous portraits of Milogevit
have emphasized both his cunning and ruthlessness, as well as his worldli-
ness and charm. American media accounts of the 1995 Dayton peace
negotiations noted how Milogevit serenaded American negotiators, drank
Johnnie Walker Scotch, cursed in colorful American epithets, waxed elo-
quent about his love of New York and its sights and smells, and the taste of
American coffee, and became misty-eyed when difficult compromises were
reached. Milogevit conveyed the perception-seconded by Ambassador
Richard Holbrooke-of a leader with whom the United States could reason
and negotiate. Milogevits charm is rooted in deception, for his charm is
malignant, that of a man whom former U.S. Ambassador Warren Zimmer-
man called "the slickest con man in the Balkans," and "a man of extraordi-
nary coldness." He has also been called "an apparatchik" and has been
vilified as "the Butcher of the Balkans."
Slobodan Milo~evit was born in 1941 in wartime Serbia, the son of a
Montenegrin theologian and a Serb Communist schoolteacher, both of
whom committed suicide during his young adulthood, as did his favorite
uncle, a general in the Yugoslav military intelligence. This depressive gene-
alogy has led many, wishfully, to speculate that when he was on the ropes,
Milogevit too would follow the path of suicide. But in fact when he is in
crisis situations, his tendency is to externalize and identify enemies as the
cause of his problems, and lash out at them.
Milogevi's vocation began quietly, following his graduation from law
school in Belgrade, and he labored in various local and state bureaucratic
jobs as an administrator and international banker, revealing little of the
charisma and ruthlessness which characterized his later rise to political
power. His wife herself has indicated that there was no trace of ideology or
nationalism in her husband.
It was only late in his career that Milogevie found his political voice
and became champion of Serbian nationalism. In the late 1980's he tapped
into the reservoir of Serb nationalist myth to fan ethnic hatreds, and
became the catalyst behind the destructive conflicts in Slovenia, Croatia,
Bosnia, and Kosovo, in which hundreds of thousands died, and millions of
refugees were "ethnically cleansed" or displaced from their homes. In 1987
Miloevit was, according to his political mentor Ivan Stambolit, "trans-
formed and set afire by Kosovo," a region of Yugoslavia with a long history
of ethnic tension. Kosovo-ninety percent of whose residents are ethnic
Albanians-is hallowed ground to the Serb people. It is the site of the
mythologized 1389 battle of Kosovo Polje, where the Serbs were defeated by
the Ottoman infidel. Many of medieval (Orthodox) Serb Christendom's
holiest sites are in Kosovo. It also holds regions rich in undeveloped min-
eral resources. Sent to Kosovo by Stambolic in order to quell the ethnic
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unrest, Milogevit instead inflamed the nationalist passions of the Kosovar
Serbs. In a 1987 speech in Kosovo, which helped catapult him to power,
Milogevit spoke eloquently to a group of disgruntled minority Serb settlers,
"This is your country, your land, your fields, your gardens, your memo-
ries." "To not fight for what belongs to Serbs," he told his enthralled listen-
ers, "would be to disgrace your ancestors and disappoint your
descendants." He evoked the spirit of Prince Lazar, the hero of the battle
of Kosovo Poije, who refused to yield to the overpowering might of the Otto-
man invaders, vowing that it was better to die in glory than to live in shame.
This was a transformational moment for the forty-six year old Milogevit.
His enthralled audience saw him as their champion of Serbian nationalism,
a role he was to play out with eloquent zeal from that moment on.
While utilizing the language of myth to foment ethnic hatred,
Milogevit has always cleverly fallen back upon legalistic formalities-cou-
pled with near-complete control of the media-in order to achieve and max-
imize his political standing. His tenacious defiance of NATO centered
largely on legal issues of sovereignty rather than nationalist myth, although
he has utilized historical symbols with great effectiveness in mobilizing
public opinion in his favor and against NATO. Besides his reliance upon
the Kosovo myth to seize power in the late 1980's, during the NATO bomb-
ing (including that which occurred on April 6, 1999) he cleverly revived
the symbolism of the Nazi war machine's bombing of a defenseless Bel-
grade on April 6, 1941, when Yugoslavia refused to capitulate to the
demands made by the Fascist aggressor during World War I. A masterful
manipulator of images, during the NATO campaign Miloevit managed to
transform himself from the ethnic-cleanser of Kosovo to the martyr-hero of
Belgrade, identifying himself with Prince Lazar. He adroitly manipulated
both the Western media and internal Yugoslav opinion during the Kosovo
crisis, skillfully exploiting the civilian casualties of the NATO bombing,
calling attention to Serb civilians maimed and killed in hospitals, schools,
and population centers. More contemporaneously, by calling President
Clinton "Hitler" and NATO "Nazis," he was evoking the memory of the cou-
rageous stand against overwhelming odds by Serbs during World War II
and identifying himself with their heroic leader Tito. During the conflict,
he utilized such symbolism in awakening unified resistance behind his
defiant banner.
This theme of defiant resistance was to continue in his trial proceed-
ings in The Hague, where Milogevit denied the legitimacy of the court, as
he had previously denied the legitimacy of NATO. His followers in Serbia
dismissed the disastrous trial in The Hague as "foreigners' justice."1
Milogevit immediately rejected the court's credibility, and armed with his
law degree, decided to defend his own case. While the aphorism that the
man who acts as his own attorney has a fool for a client is often true,
Milo~evie was very adroit in taking advantage of his double role as both
defendant and principal defense attorney. He played to his supporters
1. Editorial, Saddam Hussein's Trial, WASH. POST, July 2, 2004, at A14.
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back in Serbia, put his accusers on the defensive, and in general, turned
the trial into an international spectacle. Milogevit's extradition to The
Hague in 2001 was the beginning of a century that would yield another war
criminal before too long-one who may have watched from his palace the
initial proceedings of Milogevit's tribunal-and would soon follow in his
footsteps.
As we approach the Saddam trial, there are reasons to believe that
Miloevit's early court appearances were carefully observed by Saddam
and will be a model for his conduct in the courtroom. In order to put into
context Saddam's behavior in the upcoming trial, a political personality
profile is needed.
II. Saddam is Iraq, Iraq is Saddam
To project the likely conduct of Saddam Hussein in the second trial of
the (new) century, it is necessary to understand his complex psychology.
It is useful to consider the three principal layers of Saddam's psychology,
layers for which the architecture of his three principal residences provide
an apt metaphor.
How ironic that it should have come to this: Saddam Hussein, who
began life in a mud hut near Tikrit, ended his political career in a so-called
"spider-hole" in the ground, beneath a mud hut near Tikrit. But consider-
ing Saddam's psychological makeup, his end was, if not inevitable, cer-
tainly fitting.
The dictator was born in 1937 to a poor peasant family near Tikrit,
some 100 miles north of Baghdad, in central-northern Iraq. But the central
lines of the development of his political personality were etched before he
was born. His father died of an "internal disease" (probably cancer) while
his mother, Sabha, was pregnant with Saddam. A few months later, during
her eighth month of pregnancy, Saddam's 12-year-old brother died under
the surgeon's knife. Devastated and destitute, his mother attempted sui-
cide. A Jewish family saved her. Then she tried to abort herself, but was
again prevented from doing this by her Jewish benefactors.
After Saddam, was born, on April 28, 1937, his mother would not
accept her new-born son in her arms, turning away from him, strongly
suggesting that she was suffering from a major depression. His care was
relegated to Sabha's brother Khayrallah Talfah Msallat in Tikrit, in whose
home Saddam spent much of his early childhood. At age three Saddam
was finally united with his mother, who in the interim had married a dis-
tant relative, Hajj Ibrahim Hasan. His stepfather reportedly was abusive
both psychologically and physically to the young Saddam.
The first several years of life are crucial to the development of healthy
self-esteem, and so the failure of Saddam's mother to nurture and bond
with her infant son and the subsequent abuse at the hands of his stepfather
would have profoundly wounded his emerging self-esteem, impairing his
capacity for empathy with others. One course in the face of such trauma-
tizing experiences is to sink into despair, passivity and hopelessness. But
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another is to etch a psychological template of compensatory grandiosity, as
if to vow, "Never again, never again shall I submit to superior force." This
was the developmental psychological path Saddam followed.
From his early years, Saddam, whose name means "the One who Con-
fronts," charted his own course and would not accept limits. According to
his semi-official biography, when he was just ten, Saddam was impressed
by a visit from his cousin who knew how to read and write. He confronted
his family with his wish to become educated, and when they turned him
down since there was no school in his parents' village, he left his home in
the middle of the night, making his way to his maternal uncle Khayrallah
in Tikrit in order to study there. It is quite possible that in the approved
biography Saddam somewhat embellished his story, but there is no mistak-
ing the resentment against his mother and stepfather that emerges from it.
Khayrallah filled young Saddam's head with stories of his heroic rela-
tives, including his great-grandfather and two great uncles, who gave their
lives for the cause of Iraqi nationalism. He inspired Saddam with dreams
of glory, predicting that one day he would follow in the path of his relatives
and of the medieval heroes of the radical Arab world, Nebuchadnezzar and
Saladin, who liberated Jerusalem from the Crusaders. Khayrallah tutored
his young charge in his view of Arab history and the ideology of national-
ism and the Ba'ath Party. Khayrallah eventually facilitated Saddam's sec-
ondary schooling in Baghdad at a school known for its teaching of an
inflammatory brand of Arab nationalism. Khayrallah, who was later to
become governor of Baghdad, shaped Saddam's worldview, inspiring him
with a hatred of foreigners. In 1981, Saddam republished a pamphlet writ-
ten by his uncle, "Three Whom God Should Not Have Created: Persians,
Jews and Flies."
After officially joining the Ba'ath Party at twenty, Saddam had high
ambitions to rise within the ranks, and he did, moving from street thug to
strategist to leader. But in the end, no matter how grandiose a life a person
like Saddam constructs-and he created for himself as lavish a life as is
possible-the well of pain and insecurity caused by early wounds is
unlikely to ever be filled.
In Saddam's case, his strong desire to never again be humiliated and
abused fueled an intense rage. The stories of his cruelty are legion. In
1982 for example, when the war with Iran was going very badly for Iraq
and Saddam wished to terminate hostilities, Khomeini, who was personally
fixated on Saddam, insisted there could be no peace until the Iraqi dictator
was removed from power. At a cabinet meeting, Saddam asked his minis-
ters to candidly give their advice, and the Minister of Health suggested the
leader temporarily step down, to resume the presidency after peace had
been established. Saddam reportedly thanked him for his candor and then
ordered his arrest. When the man's wife pleaded for her husband's return,
indicating that her husband had always been loyal to Saddam, the dictator
promised her that her husband would be returned. The next day, he
returned her husband's body to her in a black canvas bag, chopped into
pieces. Actions like this powerfully concentrated the attention of other
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ministers who were unanimous in their insistence that Saddam remain in
power, for it emphasized that to be seen as disloyal to Saddam is not only
to risk losing one's job, but also one's life.
But his actions also deprived Saddam of the check of wise counsel
from his leadership circle. This combination of limited international per-
spective and a sycophantic leadership circle led him repeatedly to miscalcu-
late and ultimately led to his downfall.
Throughout his career, Saddam craved the heroic recognition his uncle
had prophesied. He believed he should be ranked with history's great
socialist leaders-Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh, Tito, and Fidel Castro. He
created a cult of personality within Iraq, with statues and murals of him
throughout Baghdad and the other cities and towns of Iraq.
But the international community never gave to Saddam the recognition
as a world-class leader that he so craved, that is, until the summer 1990
invasion of Kuwait, which was a transformational event. He gave a guttural
grunt, and oil barrel prices jumped twenty dollars a barrel, the Dow Jones
stock average fell 200 points. He had the world by the throat. More impor-
tantly, radical Arabs were cheering for him, Palestinians saw him as the
leader who would regain Jerusalem for them. It was a fulfillment of his
uncle's prophecy. It was a fulfillment of his dreams of glory.
The magnificent palaces dotting the Iraqi landscape can be seen as the
architectural model for his dreams of glory, his compensatory grandiose
self, with their inlaid woods, fine marble and gold accouterments in the
bathrooms. But what underlay the palaces? In January of 1991, German
architectural plans revealed details of a massive bunker that had been con-
structed beneath the presidential palace. Built with pre-stressed concrete
and steel, it was designed to withstand all but a direct nuclear blast. Bris-
tling with weapons, fitted with sophisticated communications equipment,
with a helicopter and disguised exit, the bunker had enough food and
water to last for a year and a half. This was the architectural motif for the
default position in his political psychology, a siege state, ready to be
attacked, ready to defend. 2
But the Saddam Hussein we saw initially during his capture was
neither the man in the bunker, nor the palace occupant. After he was
assisted out of the spider-hole, he meekly bowed his head to have a medic
examine his scalp for lice, obediently opening his mouth for a dental exam.
This was, briefly, the shattered self. The importance of the images of a
meek, humiliated Saddam giving up without a fight to his American cap-
tors cannot be overstated. The pictures of his capture showed to the world
a broken man emerging from the hole beneath the mud hut, submitting
without a fight to the will of his captors.3
This is not to say that the image of a broken man would persist.
Indeed, within hours, he had regained his composure, was in his character-
istic defiant grandiose mode, and, identifying himself as the President of
2. Jerrold M. Post, Rathole under the Palace, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003, at M1.
3. Id.
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Iraq, imperiously asked who was negotiating with him. It was anticipated
that this psychological default position would be manifest in court, which
was abundantly confirmed in the July 2004 appearance. 4
While Saddam has been characterized as the "the madman of the Mid-
dle East," our analysis demonstrates him to be a rational calculator who,
however, often miscalculates. He had watched the downfall of Ceausescu
of Romania in 1989 with concern, seeing how quickly the powerful leader
in his grand palace was overthrown by his people and hanged in the pubic
square. In the run-up to the 2003 war, he was enough in touch with reality
to recognize that Iraq could not stand up to the military might of the West-
ern alliance, and made provision to support an insurgency, which com-
menced immediately after the defeat and of course still continues. He
would have watched with great interest the trial of Milogevit for war
crimes, and he would have been enough in touch with reality to anticipate
that he too might be brought before the bar of international justice.
Thus the parallels we have seen with the style of Milogevit in the first
court appearance of Saddam Hussein, questioning the legitimacy of the
court, playing defiantly to his radical Arab supporters and to his reputation
in Arab history, are not mere coincidence but probably reflects admiration
for the success of the Milogevit tactics and a conscious resolve to model his
courtroom conduct after the Serbian dictator.
III. The Milogevit Model of Courtroom Conduct
Milogevit was arrested in April of 2001 after a dramatic exchange with
Special Forces who stormed the former leader's two-bedroom villa. With a
collection of charges in hand, police arrested him on corruption abuse and
tax evasion, while no mention of crimes against humanity was made. As
his personal bodyguards fired weapons on the intruding police outside and
loyal supporters congregated around the compound, Miloevi refused to
submit. Making frequent appearances to his front door as a gesture of grat-
itude towards his followers, he was confronted by rallying cries of "Slobo,
Slobo" and "We will not let them arrest you."'5 His urgency to hold on to
the heroic image compelled Milogevit to engage in a pathetic array of
behaviors, such as pleading in front of media cameras for wider public
support and threatening to kill himself and his family. Attempting to hold
on to a shred of dignity, he ultimately surrendered on the condition that
his personal limousine and driver escort him to jail.6 A fitting end to a
tragic comedy, the drawn out spectacle (lasting over twenty-four hours)
signified the desperation that had befallen Milogevit. 7 As a result,
Milogevit vowed to recreate his nationalist hero image on a different
stage-this time in front of a world audience. He may very well have delib-
4. Id.
5. Official: Milosevic Arrested, CNN.coM, Mar. 31, 2001, http://archives.cnn.com/
2001/WORLD/europe/03/30/milosevic.arrest.02/.
6. Milosevic Arrest, ONLINE NEWsHoUR, Apr. 2, 2001, http://www.pbs.org/news
hour/bb/europe/janjuneOl/milosevic_04-02.html.
7. Official: Milosevic Arrested, supra note 5.
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erately planned this drama with police to strengthen the victimization card
that he would later pull out in front of the judges. The man indicted for his
orchestration of genocide and crimes against humanity that killed over
200,000 would later argue that he was a victim of a politicized trial by an
illegitimate court that failed to recognize his right to defend himself.8
Milogevit has approached his trial the same way he has approached
his rule. Denigrating the legitimacy of the courts and refusing to allow
anyone to speak on his behalf, Milogevit carries himself in a consistent and
predictable fashion, using whatever means he can to create a platform for
his political grandstanding. He does not feel intimidated by the interna-
tional stature of the Hague tribunal. Instead, he scoffs at its authenticity
and proceeds to shift focus from his own indictment to the illegitimacy of
the ICTY. In one of his first appearances before the Hague tribunal in
2001, Milogevit accused the ICTY of "international kidnapping" and exag-
gerated his arrest as "[tlhe illegal seizure of an individual and his delivery
to isolation in the prison of an illegal international criminal tribunal in a
distant nation."9 Moreover, the Serbian strongman quickly dismissed the
court's appointed defense counsel, arguing that the ad hoc tribunal was not
created lawfully, and thus he had no need of appointed counsel, with the
following statement: "I consider this tribunal a false tribunal and indict-
ments false indictments. It is illegal, not being appointed by the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly, so I have no need to appoint counsel to an illegal organ
[sic."'10
Thus far in the trial proceedings, Milo~evit has done quite well for
himself. Able to avoid a Hague appointed defense team, he has escaped
unscathed after a string of derisive comments and disrespectful conduct
directed at court officials. The resignation of the first head judge, Richard
May-a stern hardliner with no patience for Milo~evit's infantile antics,
was a gift for the defense team of one. Judge May was known for turning
off Milo~evit's microphone mid-sentence when testimony turned into
tirade.1 1 Lawyers assigned to his case have even walked out by the dozen,
as Milo~evit's puerile tricks (refusing to look at or speak to the appointed
legal team) would test anyone's patience. 1 2
Milo~evit will continue to derail the proceedings because in his mind,
the war crimes tribunal is motivated solely by an agenda to convict him-in
8. Toby Sterling, After Delays, Milosevic Opens Defense, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 2004,
at All.
9. Slobodan Milosevic, Statement of President Slobodan Milosevic on the Illegiti-
macy of the Hague Tribunal (Aug. 30, 2001), http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/spch-
icty.htm [hereinafter Milosevic Statement].
10. Transcript: Milosevic in Court, CNN.coM, July 3, 2001, http://edition.cnn.com/
2001/WORLD/europe/07/03/milosevic.hearing/.
11. Milosevic Defiant Over Judge Swap, BBC NEws, Mar. 25, 2004, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/europe/3567045.stm.
12. lan Traynor, Milosevic Lawyers Ask to be Dismissed, THE GuARAr, Oct. 28,
2004, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,1337388,00.
html.
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his words, it is "part of a joint criminal enterprise." 13 As Milo evit contin-
ues this power struggle with court officials, his combative behavior seems
directed at undermining the credibility of the international justice system.
"The ICTY celebrates inequality in the rule of law using criminal sanctions
to destroy selected leaders and governments."'14 Highly politicized, there
was no basis of justice involved in its creation.
Milo~evit masterfully exploits the victimization theme-the image of
an innocent, lone leader battling the greater, corrupting institution. "The
prosecution has a huge legal and media machine on its side. What do I
have on my side? I only have a public telephone in my prison. That is all I
have to fight a terrible libel against my country, my people, and myself.'
' 5
Entering the confrontational courtroom in 2001 already branded as a war
criminal, through his own defense testimony Milogevit transformed him-
self into a victim of "terrible fabrication," a nationalist hero "humiliated,
isolated, and silenced" for attempting to defend his own people.
16
Charged with sixty-six crimes under three separate indictments (Kosovo,
Bosnia and Croatia), the defense team of one has masterfully invoked
history.
Regarding crimes against humanity in Kosovo, he referred to this
charge as an "ocean of lies" constructed by the West. 17 "Our defense was a
heroic defense against the aggression of the NATO pact."'18 Up until the
NATO bombing of 1999, which Milo~evit asserted to be the true reason
Albanians fled war torn Kosovo, he accordingly claimed the region to be
peaceful with "no evidence that there was any kind of persecution of
Albanians in Kosovo."'1 9
His speeches in the courtroom follow a predictable "distortion of his-
tory," his version of the Balkans bloodshed. 20 By singling out the Serbian
people as victims whom he boldly stood up to defend, Milo~evit attempts
to remove the culpability from his actions, shifting blame outside of his
circle of Serbian henchmen to the victims. Apart from Croatia's support to
ethnic Serbs, and Bosnian and Kosovar sponsorship of Muslim terrorists,
Milo~evit charges the European and U.S. powers with devastation to the
physical and symbolic underpinnings of Yugoslavia. "They [the Western
powers] call themselves the 'international community,' but in the territory
13. Marlise Simons, Lessons from a 'Textbook' War Crimes Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19,
2004, at 12. The phrase was originally coined by the prosecution, who accused
Milo~evit of being "part of a joint criminal enterprise."
14. Milosevic Statement, supra note 9.
15. Milosevic Hits Back at Prosecution, ONLINE NEwsHouR, Feb. 14, 2002, http://
,www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/february02/milosevic_2-14.html. Note that it is not
Milo~evit the man, but rather the martyr-hero of his beleaguered nation by which he is
identified.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Shirley Cloyes DioGuardi, Analysis of Slobodan Milosevic's Opening Testimony,
http://www.aacl.com/cloyes-response-to-hague-tribunal.html (last visited Oct. 11,
2005).
20. Sterling, supra note 8.
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of Yugoslavia-Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo-they supported a totalitarian,
chauvinist elite, terrorists, Islamic fundamentalists, neo-Nazis, whose
objective was an ethnically pure state. That is to say, a state without any
Serbs." 2 1
Fully aware of how to manipulate the Western media, Milogevit views
the trial as an ideal forum to expose the U.S. role in the dissolution of
Yugoslavia and the installation of an U.S.-backed Serbian government.
Accordingly, Milogevit uses the stage as a political platform to criticize the
West's double standards. "America crosses the globe to fight terrorism in
Afghanistan, but to fight terrorism in the heart of your own country is
considered to be a crime."'2 2 He even goes so far as to link the ICTY with
terrorism, arguing that in actuality, the Hague tribunal is "terroriz[ing] and
punish[ing] those in Yugoslavia who dared to oppose NATO aggression"
and defend their nation against acts of terrorism. 23
As Milogevit continues to play mental games with the judges, effec-
tively delaying the hearings, his rapidly deteriorating health has recently
become a major factor, placing heavy constraints on the progression of the
trial. Diagnosed with a heart condition in 2003, the sixty-two year-old ada-
mantly continues to prepare his own defense, despite his poor health
record. 24 Perceiving his ailing health as a vulnerability, he refuses to relin-
quish his basic rights to self-representation, anticipating the court's pro-
ceeding with an appointed defense council in his absence. "This is highly
improper. You do not take away somebody's right to self-defense when he
is sick."'25
He continues to vigorously cross-examine the witnesses and unleash
fiery political speeches and long-winded invectives, some ranging as long
as five hours, suggesting his final attempts to hold onto the limelight and
any remaining shreds of his heroic reputation. 26 With the courtroom as
his center stage-the only lingering form of communication with the
outside world-Milogevit has seized the momentous opportunity to set the
record straight. In due course, he will have to confront the next stage of his
life and the reality of his deteriorating health. While it remains to be seen
what bearing the illness will have on the outcome of the trial, the judges
are losing patience with his disruptive antics and the constant postpone-
ment of hearings due to the defendant's fragile state. Despite suspicions
that he is feigning illness and using his poor health as an excuse, recent
medical reports indicate Milogevit is suffering from "dangerously high
blood pressure" and is at risk of a heart attack.2 7 Nonetheless, the defen-
21. Id.
22. Milosevic Hits Back at Prosecution, supra note 15.
23. Milosevic Statement, supra note 9.
24. Ill Milosevic Puts Trial on Hold, THE AuSTRALIAN, Feb. 19, 2004, available at http:/
/www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/yugo/2004/0219hold.htm.
25. Court to Impose Lawyer on Milosevic, MSNBC, Sept. 2, 2004, http://livevideo.
msnbc.com/id/5894160/.
26. Traynor, supra note 12.
27. Milosevic War Crimes Trial Resumes after Health Scare, ABC ONLINE, http://www.
abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200504/s1353108.htm (April 25, 2005).
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dant's weakening physical state may be used to his advantage to rehabili-
tate his case. Even if he is legitimately ill, he has very adroitly made use of
his poor health to stymie the court proceedings, but at the same time, he
risks losing his basic right to act in his own defense because of his illness.
By emphasizing the illegal conduct of the Hague tribunal, "a lawless
act of political expediency by the United States," it begs the question of
how an international court system can uphold due process of law and the
presumption of innocence when there already exists a strong "compulsion
to convict." 28
As the stakes are high for both Milogevit and the ICTY to set a prece-
dent, there seems to be a spirited struggle over the spotlight at The Hague.
With pressures mounting on both sides, Milogevit must prove himself a
hero and salvage what remains of his national legacy. The court risks los-
ing credibility due to an unforeseen digression from the trial, which is now
in its third year. The ICTY must cautiously assess each forthcoming move
in order to construct a model case of legal credence with international
legitimacy.
Any form of deadlock in the case could lead to a collapse of the first
trial of the new century and have profound implications for the forthcom-
ing trial of Saddam Hussein. While the ICTY struggles to get hold of the
legal proceedings upon which Milogevit has ingeniously wreaked havoc, a
dangerous model has already been created. Vis-A-vis his conduct in front of
the court and his shrewd handling of the indictments, Milogevic has
demonstrated to the keen observer Saddam Hussein how to navigate
through the criminal court system and create an international spectacle.
IV. Defiant Defendant Saddam Hussein: Following in Milogevic's
Footsteps
A clean-shaven, well-dressed Saddam Hussein walked into the court-
room on July 1, 2004, a rather remarkable change from six months earlier.
The shattered self-image of a broken man pulled from a spider-hole near
Tikrit would only serve as a temporary break in Saddam's grandiose
facade. His defiant behavior in front of the Iraqi judge demonstrated a
return to his default position and revealed striking parallels with
Milogevit's conduct in court. It was as if he carried with him a mental
"textbook full of lessons" derived from years of testimony by Milo~evit.
29
As the next trial of the century unfolds on the international stage,
there exists a striking similarity, which we believe is not a coincidence,
between the courtroom conduct of Saddam in his first court appearance
and that of Milo~evit during his trial. Like Slobodan, the grandiose Sad-
dam very much enjoys and craves his role as a major actor in the interna-
tional arena. However, in the case of Hussein, that desire has been
apparent from the early years of his career, unlike Miloevi, who was a
grey apparatchik until his transformation at age forty-six. The defiant dic-
28. Milosevic Statement, supra note 9.
29. Simons, supra note 13.
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tator turned what was supposed to be a brief preliminary hearing, largely
administrative in nature, into his own political platform. Within twenty-six
minutes, Saddam managed to exchange combative words with the judge,
question the legitimacy of the court system, play up his hero image to Arab
supporters, and invoke history to his defense. At one point, he even turned
the table on the presiding judge, aggressively interrogating the judge on his
position and credentials, and fuming at the news of the judge's appoint-
ment by the Coalition Provisional Authority. 30 The first court appearance
demonstrates his narcissistic desires to turn the courtroom into his world
stage and maintain control over the proceedings. These striking parallels
with Milogevit are not merely a coincidence. There is reason to believe that
Saddam was actively following the Milogevit trial up until his capture in
December 2003, just as he has closely observed the downfall of other pow-
erful leaders.
Unlike Milo~evit, Saddam, whose attendance at Cairo University's law
school was only nominal, is not well versed in jurisprudence and court-
room tactics. Nevertheless, he will almost certainly overestimate his own
legal brilliance. Such behavior would mirror his controlling nature as com-
mander-in-chief of the Iraqi armed forces, even though he had no requisite
training in military leadership. Furthermore, even if he does identify a
principle defense attorney, it is assuredly the case that he will be actively
involved in his defense strategy.
Saddam's initial statement in the courtroom was a repetition of that
same, now infamous, phrase that the captured dictator first uttered when
he came out of the spider-hole: "I am Saddam Hussein, the president of
Iraq."3 1 Convinced that he is still the ruler of the Iraqi people, Saddam
outright denied the court's authority to strip him of his title, and rejected
the legitimacy of the war in which he was captured. "I'm elected by the
people of Iraq. The occupation cannot take that right away from me."'3 2
His fixation with a proper title was apparent by his frequent interruptions
to correct the judge, whom he cast as a shameful and disgraceful Iraqi. In
one particular instance, as the judge rattled off the preliminary war crime
indictments, Saddam's intent on being honored with the proper title led
him to snap back: "I did all these things as president so don't strip me of
that title."'33 It is a striking reminder of the grandiose facade still at play
and demonstrates his inability to cope with political reality. Moreover, it is
an illustration of a narcissistic individual who is able to disregard and
detach himself from the severity of the charges at hand, in order to make a
basic point regarding the mere phrasing of his title.34
30. Rory McCarthy, I am Saddam Hussein, the President of Iraq, THE GuARDtAN July 2,
2004, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1252342,00.html.
31. Defiant Saddam Rejects Court, Charges, CNN.coM, July 1, 2004, http://www.cnn.
com/2004/WORLD/meast/07/01/iraq.saddam/.
32. Id.
33. McCarthy, supra note 30.
34. Id.
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He refused to acknowledge the accusations of tie Halabja gassing
attack, mocking casually that he had "heard about that on the television
reports." 35 But it was the charge detailing Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait
that ignited a fury within, provoking a chain of ill-mannered outbursts and
body language. "In Kuwait I was protecting the Iraqi people from those
Kuwaiti dogs who wanted to turn Iraqi women into 10-dinar prostitutes."
3 6
Just as Milogevit presented Kosovo as "the cradle of Serbian civilization"
and "an integral part of the 'sovereign state of Serbia,"' Saddam used a
similar argument for Kuwait.3 7 "I am surprised you are charging me with
this. You are Iraqi and everyone knows Kuwait is part of Iraq."38 He spoke
rather defensively of the aggressive actions taken against Kuwait, asserting
that it was an agent of the U.S. and Israel. However, there was more to this
courtroom display of incitement and rage. Underlying the invasion of
Kuwait were Saddam's self-serving interests to achieve his destined role as
the heroic Arab leader, unifying the pan-Arab nation and defending against
the aggression of the West.39 Saddam's courtroom conduct thus far reveals
his refusal to accept his inevitable fate and determination to instead cling
to past dreams of glory. For example, when asked by the judge where he
lived, the former dictator quickly replied, "I live in each Iraqi's house," a
true testament to his grandiose self-concept. 40
Saddam's remark that "this is all a theater by Bush, the criminal, to
help him with his campaign" is one indication of the type of defense testi-
mony to come. 4 1 The courts must anticipate a shifting of blame to the
Western powers for Saddam will likely employ political invectives to attack
the West's double standards. This will require careful planning and consis-
tent limit setting by the court or Saddam will again take over as he did
during his brief court appearance in July 2004.
In the case of Saddam Hussein, an Iraqi special tribunal has won out
over the Milo~evie-style, ad-hoc international criminal court. The Iraqi
people feel strongly motivated to prove to the world, that as a nation of law,
Iraq is capable of carrying out justice, against even its most brutal dicta-
tors. There is a strong desire to reestablish the pride of Iraq's glorious past,
when the Hammurabi code played an important role in the development of
the law-a tradition that was set aside during the Saddam Hussein years.
Both defendants have come a long way from the days of their humiliat-
ing captures. Each forced to yield to their captors; Milogevit prolonged his
dramatic exit while Saddam surrendered instantly. With video footage
and photographic images documenting the despair of the shattered self, for
35. Defiant Saddam Rejects Court, Charges, supra note 31.
36. McCarthy, supra note 30.
37. DioGuardi, supra note 19.
38. McCarthy, supra note 30.
39. Jerrold M. Post & Amatzia Baram, Saddam is Iraq: Iraq is Saddam, in KNow THY
ENEMY: PROFILES OF ADVERSARY LEADERS AND THEIR STRATEGIC CULTURES 172, 182 (Barry
R. Schneider & Jerrold M. Post, eds., 2002), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/
awcgate/cpc-pubs/know-thy-enemy/postbaram2.pdf.
40. McCarthy, supra note 30.
41. Defiant Saddam Rejects Court, Charges, supra note 31.
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Milogevit and Saddam, this was but a temporary break in their grandiose
facades. Defiant and unrepentant, they have returned to the international
stage hoping to reinstate their heroic legacies. 42 Brought to trial on alleged
false charges, both leaders view themselves as nationalist heroes, who in
service to their countries have courageously defended their people from
outside aggression. Just as Milogevit claims to represent the Serbian peo-
ple at the Hague tribunal, Saddam feels that his entire nation has been put
on trial, not just Saddam the individual.
Serving as his own defense council, Milogevit is able to misuse his
role by directing statements towards his constituents, and refrain from the
witness stand where he would otherwise be subject to cross-examination.
While Saddam will play an active role with his defense team, there is no
indication that he will be defending himself and accordingly, in terms of
the structure of the proceedings, he will not have the freedom that
Milogevit enjoys.
As both men dismiss the inevitable reality of their fate, they cling to
their past, playing to their supporters and masterfully manipulating the
trial proceedings. With the Milogevit model in place, Saddam will use the
upcoming trial principally to seize the spotlight as his final act on the
world stage is scheduled to debut in early 2006. It remains to be seen
which layer of his psychology-the shattered self seen during his capture
from the spider-hole, the psychological siege state, or the grandiose
facade-will determine his courtroom conduct in the forthcoming trial.
Based on our understanding of Saddam Hussein's political personality and
the early indications from his preliminary appearance, we doubt that the
meek and shattered self will again be seen, but believe a mien of grandiose
defiance will be evident throughout the court proceedings.
42. Post, supra note 2.
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